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I. INTRODUCTION 
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 26, 2012, neighborhood 
watch leader George Zimmerman shot and killed seventeen-year-old 
Trayvon Martin in an Orlando-area neighborhood.1  While the events 
that triggered the shooting are clouded in controversy, it remains un-
contested that Martin was unarmed and on his return from the local 
convenience store.2  Though Zimmerman admitted to firing the shot 
that killed Martin, he asserted that it was done in self-defense.3  Au-
thorities did not arrest or charge Zimmerman immediately after the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2011 The College 
of New Jersey.  Special thanks to Professor John Kip Cornwell for his guidance 
throughout the writing of this Comment. 
 1  Julia Dahl, The Trayvon Martin Case Exposes the Realities of a New Generation of 
Self-Defense Laws, CBSNEWS (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com 
/8301-504083_162-57398005-504083/the-trayvon-martin-case-exposes-the-realities-of-
a-new-generation-of-self-defense-laws/. 
 2  Id.  The facts surrounding the incident are not completely clear.  Zimmerman 
called 911 to report a “real suspicious black guy” in the neighborhood.  Though the 
dispatcher told Zimmerman not to chase after Martin, Zimmerman followed the sev-
enteen-year-old boy and an altercation ensued.  Zimmerman states that Martin 
knocked him to the ground with a punch to the nose, smashed his head into the 
ground, and attempted to take his gun.  On April 11, 2012, the prosecutor charged 
Zimmerman with second-degree murder and a lesser offense of manslaughter.  See 
The Trayvon Martin Case: A Timeline, THE WEEK (July 17, 2012), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/226211/the-trayvon-martin-case-a-timeline 
[hereinafter Timeline].  Zimmerman chose not to assert immunity under Florida law 
but, instead, to rely on the affirmative defense of self-defense.  Seni Tienabeso & 
Matt Guttman, George Zimmerman’s Decision Leads to Summer Trial, ABCNEWS (Apr. 30, 
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-waives-stand-ground-
hearing-heads-trial/story?id=19074241. Following a jury trial, Zimmerman was ac-
quitted.  Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-
martin.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 3  Dahl, supra note 1.  
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incident.4  In the months that followed, the case gained national at-
tention5 and placed Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law under scruti-
ny. 
In particular, the initial decision by police not to arrest Zim-
merman sparked protest from both the public6 and the Martin fami-
ly.7  Sanford Police Chief Bill Lee stated in a press conference on 
March 12, 2012: “[i]n this case Mr. Zimmerman has made the state-
ment of self-defense . . . . Until we can establish probable cause to 
dispute that, we don’t have the grounds to arrest him.”8  This state-
ment reflects the implications of an immunity provision passed in 
2005 as a part of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law.9  Since 2005, 
upwards of twenty states have passed similar “Stand Your Ground” 
statutes containing provisions for criminal immunity, civil immunity, 
or both, for persons “justified” in using force.10 
 
 4  Id. 
 5  In April of 2012 30% of Americans indicated they were following the Trayvon 
Martin case more than any other story.  Timeline, supra note 2. 
 6  See Patrik Jonsson, Trayvon Martin Case Reveals Confusion Over How Stand Your 
Ground Works, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0411/Trayvon-Martin-case-reveals-
confusion-over-how-Stand-Your-Ground-works. 
 7  See Timeline, supra note 2. 
 8  See Dahl, supra note 1.  The police chief later stepped down following a “vote 
of no-confidence from the city.” Cora Currier, The 24 States That Have Sweeping Self-
Defense Laws Just Like Florida’s, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-23-states-that-have-sweeping-self-defense-laws-
just-like-floridas. 
 9  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2013). 
 10  See Wyatt Holliday, Comment, “The Answer to Criminal Aggression is Retaliation”: 
Stand Your Ground Laws and the Liberalization of Self-Defense, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 407, 407 
(2012); P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Associa-
tion-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2007); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d) (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
09.65.330 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-
808 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
503.085 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
1289.25 (West 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-11-450 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012).  Though 
additional states have amended their self-defense statutes to reflect traditional as-
pects of “Stand Your Ground” legislation, the previous list reflects those that have 
added some form of immunity provision since the enactment of the Florida statute in 
2005.  The specific aspects of these state laws will be discussed in the sections that fol-
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This Comment does not begin with the story of Trayvon Martin 
to incite discussion on the outcome of the case, or to proffer an opin-
ion regarding the veracity of Zimmerman’s defense, but to serve as an 
instructive starting point for demonstrating the harmful effects of 
one type of immunity now accorded to many defendants asserting a 
claim of self-defense.  A typical “Stand Your Ground” law is a doctrine 
of self-defense that allows a person to meet force, including deadly 
force, with corresponding force.11  These laws traditionally eliminate 
any existing duty to retreat and provide for some form of criminal or 
tort immunity.12  They are premised on, and justified by, the idea that 
law-abiding citizens should be permitted to “protect themselves, their 
families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear of 
prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and 
others.”13  The goals of this Comment are to explore the various types 
of immunity granted by recent “Stand Your Ground” laws, to high-
light the problematic aspects of these provisions, and to recommend 
changes for these statutes. 
Part II of this Comment provides a background to self-defense 
law and examples of how previous immunity provisions functioned.  
Part III discusses the new “Stand Your Ground” laws and how the ad-
dition of civil and criminal immunity changed traditional self-defense 
procedures and law.  Part IV focuses on laws granting criminal im-
munity and highlights problematic aspects of their implementation.  
Part V focuses on statutes granting civil immunity and their possible 
implications.  Then, Part VI recommends changes to these statutes.  
Part VII concludes. 
 
low.  
 11  See generally Andrea A. Amoa, Note and Comment, Texas Issues a Formidable Li-
cense to Kill: A Critical Analysis of the Joe Horn Shootings and the Castle Doctrine, 33 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2008) (describing Texas’ “Stand Your Ground” law); 
Jason W. Bobo, Comment, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat and 
Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 361–63 (2008) (de-
scribing Alabama’s “Stand Your Ground” law); Holliday, supra note 10, at 425–28, 
431–33 (describing Ohio’s and Wisconsin’s “Stand Your Ground” laws); Judith 
Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate Battery and Deadly Legal 
Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 617, 618 n.3 (2006) (describing Florida’s “Stand Your 
Ground” law). 
 12  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.  § 776.032 (West 2012). 
 13  See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (quoting the preamble to § 
776.032 of the Florida statutes); David Kopel, Florida’s New Self Defense Law, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (May 19, 2005, 11:24 AM), http://www.volokh.com/posts
/1116516262.shtml. 
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II. SELF-DEFENSE AND IMMUNITY PROVISIONS BEFORE 2005 
A. Self-Defense: Substance, Procedure, and Theory 
An American court considered one of the first self-defense cases 
in 1806.14  In Commonwealth v. Selfridge, the defendant, Selfridge, was 
charged with manslaughter for the death of Charles Austin, a young 
Harvard student.15  In his jury instruction, Judge Parker articulated 
the basic concept of self-defense: “[w]hen . . . there is reasonable 
ground to believe that there is a design to destroy his life . . . then 
killing the assailant will be excusable . . . although it should after-
wards appear that no felony was intended . . . .”16  Judge Parker went 
on to proffer a hypothetical in which the defendant (“A”) is faced 
with an opponent/victim waving a gun.17  In the hypothetical, the de-
fendant kills the victim only to later find out that the gun contained 
blanks instead of bullets.18  Judge Parker questioned: “[w]ill any rea-
sonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if 
there had been a bullet in the pistol?”19  Though both the instruction 
and the hypothetical offered by Judge Parker have been criticized as 
“off-point”20 in the context of the Selfridge fact-pattern, the ideas rep-
resented by this decision remain a part of American self-defense law.21  
Today, “[e]very state in the United States recognizes a defense for the 
use of force, including deadly force, in self-protection.”22 
Traditionally, a person is justified in his or her use of force if he 
 
 14  Ross, supra note 10, at 6. 
 15  Id. Selfridge, a lawyer and aspiring politician, had squabbled with the victim’s 
father, Benjamin Austin, over the posting of slanderous comments about him in the 
local newspaper.  Id.  Following these comments, the situation intensified and 
Selfridge armed himself.  Id.  Selfridge met with the younger Austin on the street; an 
altercation ensued resulting in the death of Charles Austin by the gun of Selfridge. 
Id. at 7. 
 16  Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest But Unreasonable Mistake of 
Fact in Self-Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 477 (1987). 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id.  
 20  Singer opines that because Selfridge’s indictment was for manslaughter, not 
murder, and his shot was unlikely to have been the result of a “mistake” as to the 
amount of force necessary, the fact-pattern of Selfridge is not ideal for a discussion of 
self-defense.  See id. 
 21  See State v. Light, 664 S.E.2d 465, 469 (S.C. 2008) (holding that a defendant 
was entitled to an instruction of self-defense when he was approached with a fire-
arm); Koritta v. State, 438 S.E.2d 68, 69–70 (Ga. 1994) (holding that the defendant 
was entitled to a self-defense instruction in an altercation involving a gun). 
 22  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 223 (5th ed. 2009). 
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or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent the im-
minent use of unlawful force against him or her by another.23  With 
this standard, a person need not experience actual harm so long as 
he possesses a reasonable belief that such harm is imminent.24  Deadly 
force is permitted only in situations where the actor has a reasonable 
belief that he is facing the imminent use of unlawful deadly force.25  In 
both instances, the defense is qualified by a requirement that the per-
son asserting the defense be a “non-aggressor” in the altercation that 
gave rise to the use of force.26 
For the most part, there was no substantive difference between 
the assertion of self-defense in a criminal matter and a civil or tort 
matter.27  In either context, a claim of self-defense is generally raised 
as an affirmative defense.28  The most critical procedural difference is 
in the allocations of burdens in either situation.29  In a criminal mat-
ter, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,30  and states differ on the burden of 
proof that is placed on the defendant with respect to an affirmative 
 
 23  Id. 
 24  See Lydia Zbrzeznj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting 
Citizens to Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 F. 
COASTAL. L. REV. 231, 233 (2012). 
 25  DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 223. 
 26  Id. at 226 (defining aggressor as “one who threatens unlawfully to commit a 
battery upon another or who provokes a physical conflict by words or actions calcu-
lated to bring about an assault”). 
 27  Caroline Forell, Symposium, Who is the Reasonable Person?  What’s Reasonable?: 
Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403 
(2010); see also Privileged Use of Force in Self-Defense, 33 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1 
(2012) [hereinafter Privileged Use of Force] (“There are few, if any, substantive distinc-
tions between civil and criminal law with regard to the prerequisites to justification of 
a claim of self-defense, and, with the exception of the rule of evidence which gives to 
a person accused of a crime the benefit of a reasonable doubt the law of self-defense 
is the same in both criminal and civil cases.”); infra text accompanying notes 47•67 
(describing the substance of self-defense law). 
 28  See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1416 (West 2012).  In subsection (1) of the 
statute it provides that “[i]n any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable 
under sections 28-1406 to 28-1416, justification is an affirmative defense.” Id. at § 28-
1416(1).  In subsection (2) of the statute, it acknowledges the same range of sections 
and provides that they serve as an affirmative defense to a civil action as well. Id. at § 
28-1416(2).  Within the range of applicable sections is the justification for the use of 
force.  See id. at § 28-1409.   
 29  See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 27, at § 1. 
 30  See id. at § 7; Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Inno-
cence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989) (“In the criminal trial setting, the presump-
tion of innocence is given vitality primarily through the requirement that the gov-
ernment prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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defense.31  Comparatively, in a civil matter, the burden of both plead-
ing and proving self-defense is on the defendant who seeks to justify 
his or her actions.32  Defendant must prove this by a preponderance 
of the evidence.33  No matter with whom the burden lies in various 
states, however, the ultimate decision rests in the hands of the judge 
or jury deciding the matter at trial.34 
The recognition of self-defense as an affirmative defense rests on 
the premise that certain actions are “justified” by their circumstanc-
es.35  “Justification” defenses typically provide protection for actions 
that are considered warranted by the situation.36  For example, a driv-
er of a fire engine may speed en route to an emergency in violation 
of local traffic laws, but the driver’s behavior would be considered 
warranted, because the risk of harm associated with the fire is greater 
than the traffic risk created by the truck’s speed.37  Members of socie-
ty would not only accept the fire engine driver’s actions, but they 
would hope that similarly situated fire engine drivers would take the 
same action.38 
By contrast, defenses such as insanity are considered “excuse” 
defenses.39  “Excuse” defenses relieve the individual actor of blame 
for their actions even if the same actions would not be excused for 
other persons.40  For example, an employee experiencing extreme 
mental and emotional issues who flies into a fit of rage and hits a co-
worker may be wholly or partially excused from liability because of his 
 
 31  See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 27, at § 7.  In some states, the defendant is 
required to prove that he acted in self-defense “either by a preponderance of the ev-
idence, by the greater weight of the evidence, by convincing evidence, by proof to 
the satisfaction of the jury, or by proof raising a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Other states 
leave the burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant was not acting in self-defense.  Id.  States may also require that the de-
fendant produce evidence that he or she acted in self-defense and leave the burden 
of persuasion on the prosecution.  Id. 
 32  Id. at § 8. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense, What’s a Jury Got To Do 
With It?, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (2009).  This is one aspect of self-defense law 
that is altered significantly by the new legislation.  See infra Part III. 
 35  See Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 388–89 
(2005); Zbrzeznj, supra note 24, at 234. 
 36  Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1897, 1900 (1984). 
 37  Id. at 1899. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Baron, supra note 35, at 388–89 (noting also that “some defenses are difficult 
to classify”). 
 40  Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 1900. 
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or her diminished mental state.41  The same attack by any other per-
son, however, would not receive protection.42 
This categorization not only draws distinction by title, it reflects 
a distinction in moral principles as well.43 
[T]o say that an action is justified is to say . . . that though 
the action is of a type that is usually wrong, in these circum-
stances it was not wrong.  To say that an action is excused, 
by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong . . . but the 
agent is not blameworthy.44 
Taking this one step further, one scholar opines that the policy justi-
fying self-defense is the very same that underlies the creation of the 
crimes to which it serves as a defense—offenses against the person 
such as murder, battery, or rape.45  Specifically, it is the societal inter-
est in life and bodily integrity that is paramount to the justification of 
self-defense and to the creation of crimes which intend to prohibit 
harmful use of force.46  Unfortunately, new “Stand Your Ground” laws 
that permit complete immunity from criminal or civil action diminish 
this respect for human life. 
B. Self-Defense: Deadly Force and the Duty to Retreat 
Recognizing the value of human life, English common law em-
braced a duty to retreat “as far as he conveniently or safely can” when 
in the face of deadly force.47  This duty reflected a historical reluc-
tance to legitimize the right of self-defense when it involved defensive 
killing.48  An exception to the duty to retreat existed, however, when a 
man was attacked in his own home.49  Reflecting the conviction that 
“a man’s home is his castle,” this exception became known as the Cas-
tle Doctrine.50  Therefore, a man faced with deadly force in his own 
home had no duty to retreat to safety before responding with force, 
 
 41  Id. at 1899–1900. 
 42  Id. at 1900. 
 43  Baron, supra note 35, at 389.  Baron acknowledges that most persons would 
prefer to have an action deemed justified versus excused.  Id. 
 44  See id. at 388–90. 
 45  Janine Young Kim, Rule and Exception in Criminal Law (Or, Are Criminal Defenses 
Necessary?), 82 TUL. L. REV. 247, 278 (2007). 
 46  Id. 
 47  See Bobo, supra note 11, at 362; Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: 
Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (citing 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 423). 
 48  See Levin, supra note 47, at 528. 
 49  Id. at 530. 
 50  Id. 
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including deadly force.51 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, there was a dramatic 
movement in the United States to abandon the duty to retreat in the 
face of deadly force.52  Resentment toward the duty to retreat grew as 
a result of the view that to require such a duty was to require coward-
ice.53  Thus, a majority of modern American self-defense statutes uti-
lize a “no retreat” rule that permits a non-aggressor to utilize deadly 
force in the face of an unlawful deadly attack, even if retreat to safety 
is possible.54  The minority of states that maintain the duty to retreat 
in the face of deadly force, however, continue to embrace the English 
common law Castle Doctrine exception.55  The Model Penal Code, for 
example, states that an “actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwell-
ing or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed 
in his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor 
knows it to be.”56 
Abrogation of the duty to retreat began in the state supreme 
courts.57  In Erwin v. State, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court held 
that a “true man” should not be required to retreat from an “assail-
ant, who . . . maliciously seeks to take his life.”58  Similarly, in Runyan 
v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the “American mind” 
weighed against imposing a duty to retreat.59  The United States Su-
preme Court followed suit, essentially rejecting the duty to retreat in 
 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. at 529. 
 53  Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; see also Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: 
Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 507 
(2007) (“The American ideals of bravery and honor suited themselves to frontier life 
in a way that the English duty to retreat could not.”). 
 54  See Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 229. 
 55  DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 531; see also People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 
(N.Y. 1914) (“It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own 
dwelling is bound to retreat.”); State v. Middleham, 17 N.W. 446, 448 (Iowa 1883) 
(stating that there is no duty to retreat in one’s home). 
 56  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (Official Draft 1985). 
 57  Bobo, supra note 11, at 344; see, e.g., Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); Erwin 
v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876). 
 58  Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199.  In Erwin, the defendant and his son-in-law were in a 
dispute over the possession of a storage shed that was located in between their two 
homes.  The day that the homicide took place, Erwin was in the shed and his son-in-
law approached him with an ax in an apparently threatening manner.  Erwin re-
sponded with a single shot that resulted in the death of his son-in-law.  Id. at 192–93. 
 59  Runyan, 57 Ind. at 84.  Runyan was convicted of manslaughter of Charles 
Pressnal.  The deceased hit him two or three times before Runyan pulled a pistol out 
of his pocket and shot him.  Id. at 81. 
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the 1921 case Brown v. United States.60  In Brown, the defendant was 
convicted of the murder of Hermis, a man who reportedly attacked 
the defendant with a knife at the time that Brown fired the fatal 
shot.61  Though it was requested by the defense, the lower court re-
fused to give a jury instruction that retreat was unnecessary if the de-
fendant reasonably feared for his life.62  Instead, the court instructed 
the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat.63  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari64 and Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion 
of the Court, stated: 
Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably be-
lieves that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous 
bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his ground and 
that if he kills him he has not succeeded the bounds of law-
ful self-defense . . . Detached reflection cannot be demand-
ed in the presence of an uplifted knife. Therefore in this 
Court, at least, it is not a condition of immunity that one in 
that situation should pause to consider whether a reasona-
ble man might not think it possible to fly with safety or to 
disable his assailant rather than to kill him.65 
Justice Holmes’ opinion not only supports the abolition of the duty to 
retreat in the face of deadly force in American jurisdictions, but it al-
so highlights the beginnings of the ideas underlying “Stand Your 
Ground” legislation.66  The use of the term “immunity” in this opin-
ion, however, does not reflect its use in the new legislation.67 
 
 60  256 U.S. 335 (1921); see also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563–64 
(1895) (holding that there is no duty to retreat when a person is on the premises of 
his or her dwelling and faced with deadly force). 
 61  Brown, 256 U.S. at 341–42.  
 62  Id. at 342. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. at 341. 
 65  Id. at 343. (emphasis added).  It is interesting to highlight within this descrip-
tion the use of “stand his ground” and “immunity.”   
 66  See generally Cantalfamo, supra note 53, at 510 (noting that an “increased un-
derstanding of human nature and the complex moral measurements required by the 
duty to retreat” lead to the privilege of non-retreat and that this realization was evi-
dent in the Holmes opinion).  The Brown decision serves as persuasive authority for 
those states dealing with issues of the duty to retreat in self-defense law.  See Bobo, 
supra note 11, at 351.  It follows that Brown also serves as some persuasive authority 
for the “Stand Your Ground” laws. 
 67  See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the Flori-
da law entitled a defendant to a pre-trial hearing regarding immunity from prosecu-
tion for lawful use of force, not merely an affirmative defense of self-defense at trial). 
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C. Immunity: Public Officials and Self-Defense 
Immunity, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “any exemp-
tion from a duty, liability or service of process.”68  Traditionally, im-
munity for an individual defendant has been based upon his or her 
status as a public official.69  The recent “Stand Your Ground” legisla-
tion, however, grants immunity to defendants who are justified in us-
ing force.70  To distinguish between the concept of an affirmative de-
fense, like self-defense, and the concept of “immunity,” it is helpful to 
examine the conceptual difference between a defense from liability 
and a defense from suit.71  Affirmative defenses generally come in the 
form of defenses from liability—a defendant admits to the elements 
that comprise the claim but desires to “justify, excuse, or mitigate the 
commission of the act.”72  By contrast, immunity, like that typically 
granted to public officials, is designed to operate as a defense from 
 
 68  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 817 (9th ed. 2009). 
 69  See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (noting that legisla-
tors are privileged and immune from arrest or civil process while performing legisla-
tive duty); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 53 (discussing absolute and qualified prosecutorial immunity); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (permitting qualified immunity to shield gov-
ernment officials from actions under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known”).  As noted by the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan, doc-
trines such as “qualified immunity” are intended to protect public officers from dis-
traction, harassment, and liability while requiring them to remain accountable for 
the irresponsible exercise of power.  555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 n.11 (2009) (recognizing that the doctrine of qualified im-
munity can shield officers from liability). 
 70  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 
2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922b (West 
2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 
2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2(e) 
(West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2012); 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450 (2012); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001 
(West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) 
(West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012).   
 71  Qualified immunity, for example, is intended to operate before the merits of 
the case are reached.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (acknowledging 
that the purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive disruption of govern-
ment and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judg-
ment”).  Affirmative defenses, by contrast, are generally used to justify or excuse cer-
tain conduct.  See supra text accompanying notes 35–39. 
 72   People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011).   
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suit before the merits of a case are reached.73 
Public officials, such as police officers and prosecutors, are often 
afforded a “qualified,” not complete, immunity for their actions.74  
The doctrine of qualified immunity grants protection to public offi-
cials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”75  The doctrine exists to bal-
ance the public’s desire to hold officials accountable for their actions 
and the officials’ desire to be shielded from liability when they per-
form their duties in a reasonable manner.76  Qualified immunity acts 
as immunity from suit, not a defense to liability.77 
Though immunity provisions contained in, or related to, self-
defense laws are relatively new, they are not a completely novel con-
cept.  Prior to the outbreak in 2005 of “Stand Your Ground” legisla-
tion featuring immunity provisions or statutes, a Colorado statute 
similarly granted immunity to persons defending their home.78  En-
acted in 1985, Colorado statute section 18-1-704.5 provides immunity 
from both civil and criminal prosecution to those utilizing force, in-
cluding deadly force, in the face of an unlawful intruder.79  The stat-
ute’s purpose, as evident in its text, is to recognize citizens’ “right to 
expect absolute safety within their own homes.”80  This justification 
bears striking similarity to the justification for the Castle Doctrine.81  
The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified, however, that this immuni-
ty is provided only when there is a known unlawful entry into the 
home.82  This requirement for unlawful entry makes the Colorado 
statute slightly more restrictive than the Castle Doctrine, which pro-
vides a defense for the use of force in one’s home qualified only by 
the requirement that the individual is not the initial aggressor.83 
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the lan-
guage of the statute provided for more than just an affirmative de-
 
 73  Maia R. Albrecht, Comment, Defining Qualified Immunity: When is the Law 
“Clearly Established?”, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 311, 318 (2001). 
 74  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 75  See id. 
 76  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 77  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 78  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704.5 (West 2013). 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  See supra text accompanying notes 50–57. 
 82  People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 313 (Colo. 1995). 
 83  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (Official Draft 1985). 
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fense to liability.84  The court held that the statute created the need 
for a pre-trial determination of a defendant’s immunity from prose-
cution.85  In rendering its decision, the court looked at both the plain 
language of the statute, as well as the definition of immunity provided 
by Black’s Law Dictionary, and determined that the statute rendered 
any proceeding against an immune party improper.86  Procedurally, 
this required a pre-trial hearing at which the defendant was required 
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she was enti-
tled to immunity under the statute.87  The pre-trial hearing was to be 
held contemporaneous with, or immediately following, the prelimi-
nary hearing in a criminal trial.88  Specifically, this required the de-
fendant to prove: 
(1) [A]nother person made an unlawful entry into the de-
fendant’s dwelling; (2) the defendant had a reasonable be-
lief that such other person had committed a crime in the 
dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or was commit-
ting or intend[ing] to commit a crime against a person or 
property in addition to the uninvited entry; (3) the defend-
ant reasonably believed that such other person might use 
physical force, no matter [how] slight, against any occupant 
of the dwelling; and (4) the defendant used force against 
the person who actually made the unlawful entry into the 
dwelling.89 
A defendant availing himself or herself of the pre-trial immunity pro-
ceeding is not later precluded from the assertion of self-defense as an 
affirmative defense at trial.90  Further, the decision by the court at the 
pre-trial is not considered a “final judgment” subject to later appeal.91 
While the Colorado courts interpreted their statute to provide 
for a pre-trial determination of immunity, other courts interpreting 
similar language prior to 2005 declined to find an independent grant 
 
 84  People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 978 (Colo. 1987). 
 85  See id. 
 86  Id. at 975. 
 87  Id. at 980. 
 88  Id. at 978 n.5. 
 89  Guenther, 740 P.2d at 981; see also Robert Christian Rutledge, Vigilant or Vigilan-
te?  Procedure and Rationale for Immunity in Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property 
Under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated §§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2, 59 MERCER 
L. REV. 629, 652 (2008). 
 90  See Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Colo. 2011); Montanez v. State, 24 
So. 3d 799, 801 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that defendant would still be 
permitted to assert self-defense  even though he was denied immunity). 
 91  Wood, 255 P.3d at 1141. 
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of immunity.92  Like Justice Holmes’s use of “immunity” in the Brown 
decision,93 other states have interpreted their statutes to provide for 
nothing more than the traditional affirmative defense.94  In Indiana, 
for example, the self-defense statute provided that no person would 
be placed in legal jeopardy for “protecting himself or his family by rea-
sonable means necessary.”95  The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the 
contention that this statute required a pre-trial hearing to evaluate 
the legitimacy of a self-defense claim before subjecting a person to 
the “legal jeopardy” of a trial, holding instead that the language was a 
mere reflection of public policy of the state.96  Similarly, in Arizona, a 
statute originally enacted in 1970 stated: “[n]o person in this state 
shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise jus-
tified pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.”97  The statute was 
challenged in Pfeil v. Smith, in which the defendant argued that her 
acquittal for justified conduct in a criminal charge was sufficient, un-
der section 13-413 of the Arizona Code, to acquit her of subsequent 
civil charges filed.98  The court, however, held that the statute did 
nothing more than to allow a person to assert the affirmative defense 
of self-defense in a civil case.99 
III. THE CHANGE IN SELF-DEFENSE AND THE ADDITION OF IMMUNITY 
While the previous section looked at traditional self-defense law 
and immunity provisions, this section details how immunity provi-
sions in “Stand Your Ground” laws have altered the “traditional” ap-
proach both substantively and procedurally.  Substantively, the “Stand 
Your Ground” laws have expanded state self-defense law by both re-
moving the duty to retreat, in those states that had previously re-
tained it,100 while also adding a presumption of reasonable force when 
 
 92  See, e.g., Loza v. State, 325 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind. 1975); Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d 
12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
 93  See supra text accompanying notes 63–65. 
 94  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012). 
 95  See Loza, 325 N.E.2d at 176. 
 96  Id. The statute at issue in Loza has since been amended; however, the new leg-
islation contains similar language.  See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(c)(2) (West 2012) 
(“No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for 
protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.”). 
 97  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012). 
 98  Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
 99  Id. at 15.  
 100  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012).  See generally text accompany-
ing notes 115–121. 
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the force is used in the home or car.101  Procedurally, the new “Stand 
Your Ground” laws generally prohibit arrest without probable cause 
that unlawful force was used,102 permit pre-trial immunity hearings for 
persons asserting self-defense,103 and prevent remedies in the civil 
courts when a person asserts statutory immunity.104 
A. Florida: Where it All Began 
The movement towards broader self-defense legislation and im-
munity provisions began in Florida in 2005.105  Conceived by former 
National Rifle Association (NRA) President Marion P. Hammer, Flor-
ida’s Protection of Persons Bill passed unanimously in the Senate and 
by overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives.106  It was 
promptly signed into law by Governor Jeb Bush on April 26, 2005,107 
and became effective October 1, 2005.108 
Prior to 2005, self-defense law in Florida combined statutory and 
common law and included a duty to retreat.109  The prior version of 
Florida’s self-defense statute 776.012 permitted the use of force if the 
defendant reasonably believed he or she faced imminent death or 
great bodily harm.110  Criminal prosecution prior to the new legisla-
tion permitted a person charged with a crime involving force, includ-
ing homicide, to raise an affirmative defense of self-defense, but it did 
not provide for a pre-trial determination of that defense.111  A prima 
 
 101  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2012).  See generally text accompany-
ing notes 115–121. 
 102  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012). 
 103  See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 104  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 
(West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012). 
 105  Ross, supra note 10, at 18. 
 106  See Daniel Michael, Recent Development: Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill, 43 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 199, 199; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Florida Gun Law to Expand Leeway 
for Self-Defense, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042501553.html. 
 107  Zachary Weaver, Note, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and 
the Need for Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 395 (2008). 
 108  See Michael, supra note 106, at 200. 
 109  Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999). 
 110  Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting 
that Section 776.012 allows for the use of deadly force “only if he or she reasonably 
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 
to himself or herself” and that “[w]hether a person was justified in using deadly force 
is a question of fact for the jury to decide if the facts are disputed”). 
 111  See generally Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049 (articulating Florida self-defense law in 
1999). 
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facie case of self-defense under the old self-defense statute consisted 
of: (1) a reasonable belief (2) that deadly force was necessary to pre-
vent imminent death (3) to himself or herself (4) or another (5) or 
to prevent the imminent commission of a felony.112  Once a defend-
ant proved a prima facie case of self-defense, the burden shifted at 
trial to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de-
fendant did not act in self-defense.113  The jury was left with the ulti-
mate decision, to determine whether the defendant subjectively held 
a belief and whether such a belief was objectively reasonable.114 
The 2005 “Stand Your Ground” law substantially amended Flori-
da’s pre-existing statutes by eliminating the duty to retreat,115 estab-
lishing a presumption that force was used reasonably where a de-
fendant was faced with an unlawful intruder in the home or occupied 
vehicle,116 and expanding the right of an individual to use force, in-
cluding deadly force, without the possibility of criminal or civil con-
sequences.117  With respect to this last aspect, immunity, the law stat-
ed: “A person who uses force as permitted in § 776.012,  § 776.013, 
or § 776.031 is justified in using such force and is immune from crim-
inal prosecution and civil action . . . .”118  It further defined the term 
criminal prosecution to include “arresting, detaining in custody, and 
charging or prosecuting the defendant.”119 
Most provocatively, the new law prohibits arrest until there is 
probable cause to support the belief that the use of force was unlaw-
ful.120  In describing the dramatic change to self-defense law, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State stated: 
 
 
 112  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2004). 
 113  Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 114  Quaggin v. State, 752 So. 2d 19, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 115  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012). 
 116  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2012). 
 117  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012). 
 118  Id.; see also id. at § 776.012 (Use of force in defense of person); id. at § 776.013 
(Home protection; use of deadly force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily 
harm); id. at § 776.031 (Use of force in defense of others). 
 119  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012). 
 120  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012) (“A law enforcement agency may 
use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection 
(1), but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines 
that there is probable cause that the force that was used is unlawful.”).  Thus, ruling 
out self-defense becomes part of the statutory requirement for a law enforcement 
officer to sign a complaint.  See Bartlett v. State, 993 So. 2d 157, 159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
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While Florida law has long recognized that a defendant may 
argue as an affirmative defense at trial that his or her use of 
force was legally justified, section 776.032 contemplates that 
a defendant who establishes entitlement to the statutory 
immunity will not be subjected to trial . . . . The statute does 
not merely provide that a defendant cannot be convicted as 
a result of legally justified force.121 
The Florida legislature was the first to pass a comprehensive up-
date of its self-defense law pursuant to NRA lobbying, but it was most 
certainly not the last.122 Due to the success of the legislation in Flori-
da, the NRA increased its efforts to have similar legislation passed 
across the country.123  Since 2005, more than half of the states have 
enacted or considered similar legislation to Florida’s statute.124  This 
Comment specifically focuses on those statutes containing provisions 
granting the accused immunity from civil and/or criminal liability for 
justified use of force. 
B. Criminal and Civil Immunity: Florida and its Followers 
At least five states have enacted statutes that include immunity 
provisions with the same language as Florida, including: Alabama, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.125  Although North 
Carolina enacted a statute containing substantially similar language 
to Florida’s legislation, it does not specifically prohibit an officer 
from arresting an individual without probable cause that the force 
used was unlawful.126  All of these statutes, however, broadly immunize 
a defendant from both criminal and civil liability.127  In addition, 
 
 121  Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010). 
 122  Ross, supra note 10, at 16–17. 
 123  Michelle Jaffe, Up in Arms Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law, 30 NOVA 
L. REV. 155, 178 (2005–2006) (“Because the law passed in Florida so emphatically, 
the NRA plans to ride their ‘big tailwind’ and get similar laws passed across the na-
tion.”).  NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre stated that this was the “first 
step of a multi-state strategy.” Roig-Franzia, supra note 106.  He stated further, “we 
start with the red and move to the blue.” Michelle Cottle, Shoot First, Regret Legislation 
Later, TIME, May 1, 2005, at 80, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine
/article/0,9171,1056283-1,00.html. 
 124  See Ross, supra note 10, at 2.  
 125  See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d)-(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2(e) 
(West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
450 (2012). 
 126  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(e) (2011). 
 127  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d)-(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 
(West 2012). 
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though other states have adopted statutes with different language, 
their effects will likely be similar.128  For example, a statute enacted in 
Georgia provides that a person “shall be immune from criminal pros-
ecution” for lawful use of force, but it does not provide the same im-
munity from civil liability.129 
Not all of these statutes have been interpreted by their respective 
state courts; the supreme courts of at least three states have acknowl-
edged, however, that the statute provides for a pre-trial immunity 
hearing.130  For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State 
held that the “plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a 
substantive right to assert immunity from prosecution and to avoid 
being subjected to a trial.”131  This right, though similar to the pre-
trial immunity determination granted to residents of Colorado,132 is 
potentially more encompassing as it applies to self-defense claims as 
well as defenses of habitation.133  The pre-trial determination of im-
munity affords a defendant a right that is substantially similar to the 
one provided to public officials.  It reflects the notion that any fur-
ther procedure against an “immune” party would be improper.134  In-
terestingly, Kansas has addressed the state’s immunity provision un-
der a petition for writ of habeas corpus.135  In McCracken v. Kohl, the 
defendant alleged that he was immune from the underlying battery 
prosecution and thus was unlawfully detained.136  Though the court 
rejected the defendant’s habeas petition, finding that his use of force 
was unjustified,137  the defendant’s argument highlights the similarity 
between this new construct of immunity and a defense to suit. 
Since 2005, approximately thirteen states have enacted statutes 
 
 128  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 2012) (stating that a person is “not 
liable for the death of or injury to” a person against whom they have utilized lawful 
force); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012) (immunizing a defendant from crimi-
nal prosecution for force used in self-defense and defense of habitation). 
 129  See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012). 
 130  See Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008); Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 
285 S.W.3d 740, 755 (Ky. 2009); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010). 
 131  Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 462. 
 132  See supra text accompanying notes 84–91. 
 133  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).  The “defense of habitation is pri-
marily based on the protection of one’s dwelling or abode.”  Catherine L. Carpenter, 
Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 665 
(2003).  “[T]he defense provides that the use of deadly force may be justified to pre-
vent the commission of a felony in one’s dwelling.”  Id. 
 134  See supra text accompanying notes 68–77. 
 135  McCracken v. Kohl, 191 P.3d 313, 313 (Kan. 2008). 
 136  Id.  
 137  Id. at 319–20; see also supra text accompanying notes 23–26. 
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providing for civil immunity for those who utilize force lawfully.138  
Though the language of these statutes is not entirely consistent, most 
of these statutes exist as stand-alone grants of immunity from civil ac-
tion.139  Idaho, for example, entitles its statute, section 6-808, “Civil 
immunity for self-defense.”140  Similarly, Tennessee entitles its statute 
“Use of force; civil immunity; costs and fees.”141  Texas simply entitles 
its section 83.001 “Civil Immunity.”142 
These titles seem to reflect the notion that they provide some 
form of immunity greater than the affirmative defense traditionally 
offered defendants faced with claims of civil liability.  Unfortunately, 
judicial interpretation of the function of these statutes is limited.  
Although it has yet to be conclusively decided by the courts, it seems 
safe to assume that they function to prevent the assertion of claims 
against a defendant justified in his or her use of force the same way 
that immunity in the criminal setting protects a defendant from ar-
rest, detention, charging, and prosecution.143 
IV. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMMUNITY IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 
In these new “Stand Your Ground” regimes, immunity from 
criminal “prosecution” generally prohibits arresting, detaining, 
charging, or prosecuting anyone falling under the statute’s shield.144  
Such a broad definition necessarily implicates the actions of govern-
ment actors in all phases of the criminal justice process.  This section 
examines the law with respect to each aspect of the “prosecution” 
from which a person becomes immune if they use force lawfully. 
 
 138  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2012); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) 
(West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a 
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); TENN. 
CODE. ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 
(West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) 
(West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012).  At the time of this writing, pro-
posed legislation in New Hampshire seeks to remove the civil immunity provision 
from the state statute.  H.B. 135, 163rd Leg., Sess. of the Gen. Court (N.H. 2013).   
 139  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 
(West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012). 
 140  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012). 
 141  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012). 
 142  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012). 
 143  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012). 
 144  Id. 
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A. Problems for Law Enforcement 
The Florida statute and other similar laws include “arrest” and 
“detaining in custody” in the definition of prosecution from which a 
defendant is immune.145  The statutes go further to specifically pro-
hibit law enforcement from initiating an arrest until probable cause is 
established that force was not used lawfully, that is, in self-defense, 
defense of others, or defense of home.146  While probable cause is the 
constitutional standard by which police effectuate a lawful arrest,147 
the law now requires that law enforcement obtain not only probable 
cause that a crime has occurred, but also probable cause that refutes 
the person’s probable affirmative defense.148  Therefore, a law en-
forcement officer, in the earliest stages of criminal prosecution, is 
tasked with evaluating the affirmative defense of the accused, on sce-
ne, if they desire to arrest the individual.149 
1. The Potential for Inconsistency and Abuse 
Due to the lack of legislative clarity regarding the application of 
the immunity statute, there is a great potential for inconsistent appli-
cation and possible abuse of this statute by law enforcement.150  Nota-
bly, the law received significant opposition from the law enforcement 
community prior to its original passage in Florida.151  Several urban 
police chiefs spoke out against the law, calling it “unnecessary and 
dangerous” and publicly opposing its passage.152 
 
 145  Id. The Oklahoma statute, however, includes only charging and prosecuting in 
the definition of “criminal prosecution.”  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25F (West 
2012).  Interestingly, it does include the same requirement that a law enforcement 
agency refrain from arrest until it determines that probable cause exists to prove the 
force used was unlawful.  See id. at § 1289.25G. 
 146  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012). 
 147  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause”); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that, in the absence 
of a search warrant, “[w]hether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally valid depends . . . up-
on whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officer[] had probable cause to 
make it”). 
 148  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012) (Immunity from criminal prosecution 
and civil action for justifiable use of force); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 
2012) (Use of force in defense of person). 
 149  See Elizabeth B. Megale, Deadly Combinations: How Self-Defense Laws Pairing Im-
munity with a Presumption of Fear Allow Criminals to “Get Away with Murder,” 34 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 105, 130 (2010). 
 150  Id. at 119. 
 151  See Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27
/national/27shoot.html?_r=0. 
 152  Id. 
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With respect to its application, no statute provides clear instruc-
tions as to the required procedures.  Section two of the Florida self-
defense law,153 for example, permits law enforcement to use “standard 
procedures for investigating” to determine the existence of probable 
cause;154 however, it does not clearly establish what those procedures 
entail for law enforcement agencies across the state.155  The Eleventh 
Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory recognized this lack of clarity stating, 
“[u]nder Florida law, law enforcement officers have a duty to assess 
the validity of this defense, but they are provided minimal, if any, 
guidance on how to make this assessment.”156  While it may be true 
that law enforcement agencies receive training in arrest procedures, 
the statute now requires them to evaluate more than just the exist-
ence of a crime.157  They are charged with both understanding the 
self-defense law and evaluating whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that such a defense would fail.158  Law enforcement officers are 
not trained in this type of legal analysis.159 
Complicating the decision further is the requirement that the 
officer prove a negative.160  The statute requires that police officers 
ascertain probable cause that “the force that was used is unlawful.”161  
Therefore, not only must an officer have an understanding of the 
reasonableness and proportionality requirements that render use of 
 
 153  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).  In the Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Oklahoma, and South Carolina statutes, this same language is reflected in the follow-
ing subsections: ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231(b) (West 
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085(2) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
1289.25G (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450(B) (2006). 
 154  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).   
 155  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012); see also Patricia Wallace, Stand Your 
Ground: New Challenges for Forensic Psychologists, 2006 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 37, 39 
(noting that law enforcement agencies are trained to handle crime scenes but not 
necessarily trained to evaluate reasonableness with respect to reasonable use of force 
and deadly force). 
 156  Reagan v. Mallory, 429 Fed. App’x 918, 920 (11th Cir. 2011).  The circuit 
court reversed the district court finding that a reasonable officer could not have 
thought there was probable cause to establish a crime of aggravated assault and 
granted the officer qualified immunity.  Id. at 922. 
 157  See FLA STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012); see also Wallace, supra note 155, at 
39. 
 158  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).   
 159  STEVEN JANSEN & M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, EXPANSIONS TO THE CASTLE 
DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Castle%20Doctrine.pdf (noting that the attitude of a law 
enforcement officer might affect their performance). 
 160  See id.; Weaver, supra note 107, at 419. 
 161  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).   
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force “unlawful,” but they must also have evidence supporting the ab-
sence of lawful use of force before they arrest.  Without probable cause 
proving that negative, law enforcement is prohibited from arrest-
ing.162 
Inconsistency is already evidenced by the incongruent treatment 
of factually similar cases in the state of Florida. While there is no rele-
vant tracking system of law enforcement decision-making in self-
defense cases,163 much of the information demonstrating the effects 
of immunity from arrest can be deduced from the media.  Incidents 
that took place after the enactment of the “Stand Your Ground” law 
provide some insight as to the impact of placing an immunity deci-
sion on law enforcement.  The case that has gained the most signifi-
cant media attention is the aforementioned Trayvon Martin case.  
Seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin was fatally shot while returning 
from the neighborhood convenience store.164  Martin was unarmed.165  
George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch leader, stated that he 
shot the boy in self-defense, and he was not immediately arrested.166  
The local police chief reported that the delayed arrest was a result of 
the absence of probable cause to believe that Zimmerman had used 
force unlawfully under the Florida law.167 
The inconsistent application of the law is demonstrated by com-
paring Zimmerman’s situation to the plight of Jimmy Ray Hair.168  In 
Hair v. State, Hair and the victim, Charles Harper, were engaged in a 
verbal argument at a nightclub.169  As in the Trayvon Martin case, and 
many self-defense cases, the facts that follow are somewhat disput-
ed.170  Hair asserted that Harper reached into the vehicle in which 
 
 162  Id. at § 776.032(2).  In Alabama, this prohibition led to a claim of false impris-
onment against a law enforcement officer who detained a man alleging that he uti-
lized force in self-defense.  Skinner v. Bevans, 116 So. 3d 1147, 1155 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2012).  The court assumed the defendant’s arrest to have “been the result of an in-
vestigation that determined there was probable cause to believe” that the force used 
was unlawful.  Id. 
 163  Zbrzeznj, supra note 24, at 261.  The State of Florida seems to acknowledge 
the absence of this data.  Florida proposed legislation that would require that law en-
forcement officers “collect, process, maintain, and disseminate information and data 
on all incidents concerning the alleged justifiable use of force” in the state; the bill 
died in the Senate in May of 2013.  H.B. 331, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
 164  Dahl, supra note 1. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Timeline, supra note 2. 
 167  Dahl, supra note 1. 
 168  Hair v. State, 17 So. 3d 804, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).   
 169  Id. at 805. 
 170  Id.; see also Megale, supra note 149, at 105. 
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Hair was a passenger, and the two began to struggle.171  Hair then 
pulled out his gun and fired a shot at Harper.172  The police not only 
arrested Hair, but he sat for two years in jail awaiting a trial on a 
charge of first degree murder before eventually being granted im-
munity under Florida statute 776.032.173 
This lack of clarity could even lead to abuse, whether intentional 
or unintentional, by law enforcement.174  Officers draw their own sub-
jective conclusions from a situation.  If, for example, an officer feels 
that the individual “victim” in an altercation where the self-defense is 
invoked “deserved” what was coming to him, the officer may decline 
to arrest or to thoroughly investigate the incident.175  Normally, an of-
ficer would be required to arrest if probable cause exists that the 
crime occurred, regardless of the officer’s subjective assessment of 
the situation, and the existence of a victim would likely permit him or 
her to effectuate that arrest.176  With immunity, however, a single of-
ficer has the ability to decline to arrest, and this decision could po-
tentially be influenced by his or her own subjective assessment of the 
situation.177  By contrast, if the issue of self-defense were to reach trial, 
the persuasiveness of the perpetrator’s claim of self-defense would be 
assessed by a jury178 comprised of a cross-section of the community.179  
Thus, ostensibly permitting a single officer to render a decision re-
garding a potential defendant’s immunity detracts from the benefits 
 
 171  Hair, 17 So. 3d at 805. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Megale, supra note 149, at 105. 
 174  See id. at 107–08.   
 175  See id. at 108. 
 176  See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a 
law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable 
cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”); United 
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175 (1949). 
 177  Trish Oberweis & Michael Musheno, Policing Identities: Cop Decision-Making and 
the Constitution of Citizens, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 903 (1999) (“In viewing police 
stories from the perspective of identity, we suggest that what police think ought to be 
done and what they do in particular situations depends, in part, on who is in-
volved.”). 
 178  This assumes the right is not waived and that the crime at issue is of sufficient 
gravity to trigger the right.  See Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III’s 
Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 373, 376 (2012) (describing the exceptions to the constitutional requirement 
for a trial by jury in criminal cases). 
 179  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“[S]election of a petit jury from 
a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”). 
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of both the multiplicity and the diversity of the decision-maker that is 
embodied in jury trials.180 
This possibility for abuse is highlighted in a story reported in 
Clearwater, Florida.181  Kenneth Allen, a retired police officer, and his 
neighbor, Jason Rosenbloom, argued on prior occasions due to Ros-
enbloom’s failure to follow local codes.182  On the day of the incident, 
Rosenbloom visited Allen’s home and threatened to make his life 
miserable.183  Allen closed the door and got a pistol from nearby.184  
Rosenbloom refused to leave and began to rush into the house.185  Al-
len fired a shot.186  Police never arrested Allen who claimed that he 
was trying to stop a potential “home invasion” and to “keep his house 
safe.”187  Among the possible foundations for the decision not to ar-
rest may be the fact Allen was a retired police officer.  This type of in-
consistency and abuse is severely problematic. 
2. Law Enforcement as the Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury 
In granting immunity from arrest and detention, Florida statute 
section 776.032 and those with similar language make law enforce-
ment personnel the initial arbiter in deciding whether a person is ex-
ercising a valid self-defense claim.188  If a prosecutor decides not to 
pursue the cases in which police decline to investigate, law enforce-
ment officers become the ultimate decision-makers regarding wheth-
er or not a case is adjudicated.189  This effectively removes the deter-
mination of the perpetrator’s innocence or guilt from the court.190  
This was recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory, 
 
 180  Id. at 530 (“purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary pow-
er”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (noting that the “essential feature 
of a jury obviously lies . . . in the community participation and shared responsibility 
that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence”); Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 181  Ashlee Clark, Neighbor: Shooting in Defense of Himself, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 7, 
2006), http://www.sptimes.com/2006/06/07/Northpinellas
/Neighbor__Shooting_in.shtml. 
 182  Id.  
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Clark, supra note 181. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. 
 188  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012); see also Megale, supra note 149, at 
118–20. 
 189  See Megale, supra note 149, at 118–20. 
 190  See id. 
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evaluating Florida’s self-defense law.191  The court stated that by defin-
ing criminal prosecution so broadly, “the statute ‘allows for an im-
munity determination at any stage of the proceeding.’”192  Therefore, 
a decision by law enforcement at the earliest stage of the proceedings 
bars potentially meritorious claims from evaluation by an objective 
judge or jury. 
Most concerning is that law enforcement must make this deci-
sion without the benefit of all of the evidence normally presented to 
the trier of fact.  In many of the situations in which law enforcement 
officers must now apply the standard, all of the necessary evidence is 
in the hands of the defendant.193  In the Trayvon Martin case, for ex-
ample, the victim of deadly force was no longer available to give his 
account of the altercation.194 The only remaining evidence with which 
law enforcement could have established probable cause needed to 
come from the very person asserting the defense, Zimmerman.  It is 
highly unlikely that Zimmerman would have said or done anything to 
undermine his own asserted self-defense, and his Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination allowed him to remain silent.195  
Therefore, arrest needed to wait.  In fact, Zimmerman’s assertion of 
self-defense was enough to prevent the police from arresting him for 
several months.196  Even if witnesses were available to deliver their in-
terpretation of the altercation, police were still required to assess the 
reliability of an individual’s testimony or recounting of the events, a 
role typically left to the jury or the trier of fact.197 
Further, during the time between the incident and the arrest, as-
suming the two are not contemporaneous because the police cannot 
establish the requisite probable cause, the defendant would live 
 
 191  Reagan v. Mallory, 429 Fed. App’x 918 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 192  Id. at 920 (quoting Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
(2009)). 
 193  Reagan, 429 Fed. App’x 918. 
 194  See supra text accompanying notes 2–4. 
 195  See B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Ex-
torting Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 597 (1970) (noting that 
the Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling a defendant to act as a witness against 
himself). 
 196  Though the incident occurred in February of 2012, Zimmerman was not 
charged with a crime until April of that year.  Timeline, supra note 2; see also text ac-
companying notes 1–8. 
 197  See Elaine D. Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections on Witness Credibility, Expert Testi-
mony, and Recantation, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 145, 145 (1986) (acknowledging that in a 
trial by jury, the jury is the sole judge of witness credibility). 
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amongst the general population.198  This seems contrary to the pur-
ported goal of the legislation to allow “law-abiding people to protect 
themselves.”199  Allowing the defendant to live free in society poten-
tially places a law-breaking citizen in a position to threaten the life or 
body of another law-abiding citizen.  It also provides the defendant 
with an opportunity for escape.  The purpose of arrest, and subse-
quent detention, of an individual, is not only to prevent harm to the 
community, but also to assure that the arrested individual is available 
for later proceedings.200  The Trayvon Martin case exemplifies the 
possibility for escape.  George Zimmerman’s whereabouts in the 
weeks following the incident were reportedly unknown.201  The attor-
ney representing Martin’s parents expressed concern that even if the 
state of Florida decided to file charges against Zimmerman, he would 
be unavailable to face them.202  He stated, “[w]e’re concerned that he 
might be a flight risk, that nobody knows where he’s at.”203  While po-
lice indicated that they were in contact with Zimmerman, there was 
speculation that Zimmerman had left the jurisdiction of Florida.204  
Police eventually charged and arrested Zimmerman on April 11, 
2012, and a jury acquitted him on July 13, 2013.205 
B. Problems for Prosecutors and Judges 
The states granting immunity in the criminal context provide 
immunity not only from arrest but also from charging and prosecu-
 
 198  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).   
 199  See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 200  See Robert Webster Oliver, Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention, N.Y. ST. 
B.J. 8 (1997) (noting that the New York bail law is focused on risk of flight). 
 201  Peter Grier, Suddenly Missing George Zimmerman Appears to Have Fled Florida, 
ALASKA DISPATCH (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/print/article/suddenly-missing-george-zimmerman-
appears-have-fled-florida; Where is George Zimmerman?, CBSNEWS (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57412307/where-is-george-zimmerman-
/ [hereinafter Where is George Zimmerman?]. 
 202  Grier, supra note 201. 
 203  Where is George Zimmerman?, supra note 201. 
 204  Where is George Zimmerman?, supra note 201.  Notably, Zimmerman’s attorneys 
had discontinued representation “in large part because he was hiding and had 
stopped responding to their calls.”  Grier, supra note 201.  Though his former attor-
neys indicated that they did not believe that Zimmerman intended to flee the coun-
try, they had no knowledge of his actual whereabouts.  Id. 
 205  Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 2; Matt Gutman, Candace Smith & Pierre 
Thomas, George Zimmerman Charged with 2nd Degree Murder in Trayvon Martin’s Death, 
ABCWorldNews (Apr. 11, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-
charged-murder-trayvon-martin-killing/story?id=16115469. 
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tion.206  This grant of immunity necessarily implicates and alters the 
role of prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice process.207  Be-
cause prosecutorial decisions are not subject to review by the court, 
however, it would be difficult to identify precisely how a defendant’s 
assertion of self-defense affected prosecutorial decision-making prior 
to the enactment of such legislation.208  After its enactment, one pros-
ecutor stated that “the real impact [of the law] has been that it’s mak-
ing filing decisions for prosecutors.  It’s causing cases to not be filed 
at all or to be filed with reduced charges.”209  While this statement is 
difficult to substantiate because statistics on the number of self-
defense claims made are unavailable,210 it demonstrates at the very 
least that some prosecutors are concerned with the law’s effect on 
charging decisions.  In Duval County, Florida, the State Attorney in-
dicated that the law has influenced the office’s decision to charge or 
reduce charges in a handful of cases.211  Specifically, he cited his of-
fice’s decision not to charge electronics store owner Doug Freeman 
in the shooting of an unarmed man, Vince Hudson, in May of 2006.212  
State Attorney Harry Shorstein, though publicly siding with the 
wounded individual, declined to prosecute stating that he did not be-
lieve he could get a conviction.213  Similarly, Florida State Attorney 
Andy Slater cited the “Stand Your Ground” law, as well as conflicting 
witness testimony, as the reasons for offering a plea agreement to a 
defendant that stabbed a man at a party.214 
With the imposition of pre-trial hearings on immunity, judges 
face an additional task in the criminal justice process.215  For example, 
 
 206  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012). 
 207  See Weaver, supra note 107, at 406–07. 
 208  See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The 
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1325, 1337 (1993). 
 209  J. Taylor Rushing, Deadly-Force Law Has an Effect, but Florida Hasn’t Become the 
Wild West, FLA. TIMES-UNION (July 10, 2006), http://jacksonville.com/tu-
online/stories/071006/met_22294481.shtml. 
 210  Weaver, supra note 107, at 407. 
 211  See id. 
 212  See Dana Treen, Shorstein Sides with Man Shot in Store, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jun. 
21, 2006), http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/062106/met_22160331.shtml. 
 213  See id. 
 214  See Missy Diaz, Teenager Takes Plea Deal in Stabbing Case, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, 
Sept. 29, 2007, at 1B, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2007-09-
29/news/0709290006_1_plea-deal-slater-teenager. 
 215  See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that § 776.032 
entitles a defendant to a pre-trial determination of immunity).  It should be noted 
that not all “Stand Your Ground” statutes have thus far been interpreted to permit a 
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the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State adopted the pre-trial 
immunity procedure articulated by the First District Court of Appeals 
in Peterson.216  The Peterson court largely followed the Colorado court 
in People v. Guenther and held that the defendant raising an immunity 
claim has the burden of establishing the factual prerequisites by a 
preponderance of the evidence.217  Therefore, a judge hearing a case 
in which the defendant asserts immunity under the “Stand Your 
Ground” legislation must evaluate the defendant’s immunity claim 
utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard prior to trial.  
These additional hearings also constitute an addition to the judge’s 
caseload that would not otherwise exist in a jurisdiction in which a 
defendant may assert only an affirmative defense of self-defense.218  By 
requiring additional hearings,219 these legislative hearings may un-
dermine judicial economy. 
V. THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF  IMMUNITY IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT 
An increasingly large number of states have established provi-
sions to allow for a defendant’s immunity from civil liability if the de-
fendant used lawful force.220  Though there is not yet substantial judi-
cial interpretation, a careful analysis reveals a number of potential 
problems. 
Specifically, the laws do not distinguish between liability for inju-
ry to the unlawful aggressor and liability for injury to a third party.221  
In fact, North Dakota is among the minority of these states that per-
mits immunity from civil liability but recognizes an exception if a per-
son “recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to oth-
er persons.”222  Such an individual would be liable “in a prosecution 
for such recklessness or negligence.”223  In statutes that do not carve 
out this particular exception, a person justified in utilizing force may 
not be held liable for injuries that result to a third party.224  This situa-
 
pre-trial determination of immunity. 
 216  Id.  
 217  Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 218  Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 462 (noting that Florida law does not recognize that a de-
fendant may argue something more than affirmative defense). 
 219  See id. 
 220  See supra text accompanying notes 138–143. 
 221  See JANSEN, supra note 159, at 7. 
 222  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-01 (West 2011); see N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011) (North Dakota’s civil immunity statute). 
 223  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-01 (West 2011). 
 224  See JANSEN, supra note 159, at 6. 
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tion is exemplified by an occurrence in Miami-Dade County, Florida 
in 2006.225  As a nine-year old girl sat outside her home playing with 
her dolls, she was shot in the crossfire between two men, both of 
whom asserted a claim of self-defense.226  If both are successful in a 
claim of immunity, this eliminates any legal remedy, either civil or 
criminal, for the innocent girl.227  The Florida statute may justify a 
deadly defense, even if it was executed negligently or recklessly.228 
Though criminal and civil self-defense cases involving the same 
defendant are rare, the availability of a civil remedy has afforded 
some individuals or their families a remedy when the criminal justice 
system did not.229  The case of Bernhard Goetz is arguably the para-
digmatic example of the use of self-defense by the same defendant in 
both a criminal and civil trial.230  In Goetz, Bernhard Goetz boarded a 
subway train at Fourteenth Street in Manhattan and sat down in the 
same car as four youths.231  In his possession was an unlicensed .38 cal-
iber pistol.232  One of the youths approached Goetz and stated “give 
me five dollars.”233  None of the juveniles displayed a weapon.234  Goetz 
responded by firing shots at each of the four boys.235  One youth was 
struck in the chest, another in the back, the third in his left side, and 
the fourth was initially unscathed.236  Goetz then turned to the fourth 
youth and stated, “you seem to be all right, here’s another.”237  He 
fired a fifth bullet at the fourth youth, severing his spinal cord.238  
Goetz fled immediately following the incident.239  However, nine days 
later Goetz surrendered himself to police.240  Goetz was eventually in-
 
 225  See id. 
 226  Id. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Id.  At the time of this writing, Florida has proposed legislation providing that 
“immunity does not apply to injuries to children and bystanders who are not affiliat-
ed with an overt act.”  H.B. 123, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013); see also S.B. 
362, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013) (reflecting the same exclusion for children 
and bystanders). 
 229  See Forell, supra note 27, at 1406. 
 230  Id. at 1407. 
 231  People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
 232  Id. at 43. 
 233  Id. 
 234  Id. 
 235  Id. 
 236  Id. at 43–44. 
 237  Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44. 
 238  Id.  
 239  Id. 
 240  Id. 
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dicted for attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and 
criminal possession of a weapon.241  Goetz argued that his actions 
were justified as self-defense.242  New York self-defense law at the time 
of the incident justified the use of deadly force when a person “be-
lieved deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly 
force or the commission” of an enumerated felony and, if the District 
Attorney did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she did 
not have such beliefs, the jury would determine “if a reasonable per-
son could have had such beliefs.”243 
On June 16, 1986, a jury acquitted Goetz of attempted murder, 
assault, and reckless endangerment.244  He was convicted only of one 
count of illegal weapons possession, a felony that carries a maximum 
penalty of seven years confinement.245  Despite this acquittal, Goetz 
was later subject to civil suit.246  Darryl Cabey, the fourth youth who 
suffered from a severed spinal cord as a result of the shooting, filed a 
$50 million civil suit in the Bronx Supreme Court alleging that the 
shots taken at his back were made “deliberately, willfully, and with 
malice.”247  Cabey prevailed in this later civil suit in 1996, receiving a 
$43 million judgment in his favor.248  With the enactment of provi-
sions providing civil immunity, however, such civil suits may no long-
er be filed.  This would result in the denial of a remedy to a person 
who might otherwise receive an award of damages. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE NEED FOR CHANGE OR CLARIFICATION 
The most effective avenue for change is to advocate for adminis-
trative alterations or amendments to the existing laws to promote 
uniformity and to reduce the problematic application highlighted in 
the previous sections.249  The following discussion details those rec-
 
 241  Id. at 45.  There were a series of indictments and dismissals before these 
charges were solidified.  Id. 
 242  Id. at 46–50 (discussing New York self-defense law). 
 243  Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 52. 
 244  LILLIAN B. RUBIN, QUIET RAGE: BERNIE GOETZ IN A TIME OF MADNESS 257 (1986).  
The media attention surrounding this event largely exalted Goetz as a hero who had 
thwarted a mugging.  Id. at 7.  Even before Goetz had turned himself in as the gun-
man, there was a media “love affair” with him.  Id. at 9.  
 245  Id. at 257.  Goetz was ultimately sentenced to six months confinement, $5,000 
fine, and five years of probation.  Id. at 262. 
 246  See Forell, supra note 27, at 1407. 
 247  RUBIN, supra note 244, at 189. 
 248  Jonathan Markowitz, Bernhard Goetz and the Politics of Fear, in VIOLENCE AND THE 
BODY: RACE, GENDER, AND THE STATE 209 (Arturo J. Aldama ed., 2003). 
 249  See supra Parts IV, V. 
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ommendations. 
A. Legislative Recommendation: The Florida Legislature Should Remove 
“Arrest” and “Detaining in Custody” from the Definition of 
Criminal Prosecution 
The legislature should remove the immunity decision from the 
purview of law enforcement decision-making by eliminating “arrest” 
and “detaining in custody” from the definition of criminal prosecu-
tion in the statute.  These are the areas in which the greatest poten-
tial implementation problems exist.250  Overall, the calculation of rea-
sonable force should not be within the scope and duties of law 
enforcement.  Law enforcement training in arrest procedures does 
not provide the necessary foundation for the complex legal analysis 
associated with assessing an individual’s unlawful use of force.251  Fur-
ther, placing this responsibility on the shoulders of law enforcement 
makes them the initial, and possibly final, decision-maker though 
they are not equipped with the same volume of evidence that may be 
available later in the prosecution.  This aspect of the immunity provi-
sion also runs the risk of allowing the subjective beliefs of an officer 
to prevent the prosecution of a guilty party. 
With these removed, criminal prosecution would include charg-
ing and prosecuting the defendant.252  This would place the decision 
largely in the hand of the prosecutor and reduce the discretion of law 
enforcement in arrest decisions to the more common requirement of 
probable cause that the crime has occurred.  Allowing “charging” and 
“prosecution” to remain included in the definition of “criminal pros-
ecution” does not carry the same inherent problems created by the 
inclusion of “arrest” and “detention.”  Providing immunity to crimi-
nal defendants simply adds to the considerations a prosecutor may 
need to make in deciding whether to charge or with what crime to 
charge a particular defendant. 
The only other impact is the addition of a requirement for pre-
trial determinations of immunity, if the court interprets the statute to 
function like the courts in Dennis v. State and People v. Guenther.253  
Though such proceedings alter the common notion of self-defense as 
an affirmative defense asserted at trial, they seem to function like ad-
 
 250  See supra Part IV.A. 
 251  See Wallace, supra note 155, at 39. 
 252  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012). 
 253  People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 
(Fla. 2010).  
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ditional pre-trial summary judgment proceedings with likely insub-
stantial effect.  This amendment would still allow the statute to pro-
tect the defendant from the fear of prosecution because charges 
could be dismissed prior to trial.  In this way, the defendant would 
not be subject to complete criminal prosecution. 
B. Administrative Recommendation: Alternatively, the State Should 
Require Law Enforcement to Report Investigative Procedures 
Regarding Self-Defense Claims 
The law should require law enforcement to report the assertion 
of self-defense claims in order to conduct an adequate assessment of 
the effects of these laws, particularly the effects of the provision of 
immunity from arrest.254  Requiring law enforcement to track the 
manner in which they investigate and to log the cases that they de-
cline to arrest would provide greater clarity regarding the effects of 
the law.  Based upon the data collected, it may be possible to create a 
uniform procedure for assessing probable cause in self-defense 
claims.  In order to create such a standard, law enforcement officers 
must report all instances in which they decline to arrest based upon 
their evaluation of probable cause in a case of self-defense.  Law en-
forcement personnel should report to their own agency.  The agency 
would then compile the data across the state and evaluate it to exam-
ine the various practices of law enforcement and their differing in-
terpretations of what the law requires of them.  From this compila-
tion the administration would need to create a usable standard for 
law enforcement officers investigating assertions of self-defense. 
In conjunction with a usable standard, all law enforcement offic-
ers must undergo additional training regarding the new self-defense 
law.  This training would provide greater knowledge of the intricacies 
of the “Stand Your Ground” law to allow proper implementation.  At 
the moment, the confusion surrounding the law makes it difficult for 
anyone to properly understand the situations in which the use of 
force is, in fact, considered lawful and justified.  Due to the enhanced 
role of law enforcement officers under these statutes, their under-
standing of the law is imperative. 
Further, the law should require prosecutors to report the cases 
in which they decline to charge or reduce charges based primarily 
upon the existence of the “Stand Your Ground” law.  This would 
permit a more thorough understanding of the actual effects that the 
 
 254  See supra text accompanying notes 163–164. 
RANDOLPH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2014  2:38 PM 
630 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:599 
 
law has on prosecutorial decision-making. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by highly-publicized cases, such as that of Trayvon 
Martin, the inclusion of immunity from criminal and civil liability in 
recent legislation has significant and potentially dangerous conse-
quences.  Particularly, the expansion of the role of law enforcement 
in many recent statutes provides for both inconsistent application of 
the statute and unwelcome results in its implementation.  While our 
criminal justice system seeks to promote justice, statutes making law 
enforcement the initial arbiter of a person’s guilt thwart that end by 
preventing a case from reaching its factual merits.  Based upon this 
assessment, law enforcement should be required to engage in uni-
form procedures or the law should be amended to remove law en-
forcement discretion in arrest.  All states considering similar legisla-
tion should refrain from including “immunity from arrest” in the 
statute’s construction. 
 
